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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a study of the proo3.em of
the uneven officer distribution in the Navy rank
structure caused by wartime expansion. and resulting
in Congressional legislation commonly referred to as
"The Hump Bill". ' The study is an effort to analyze
the degree of success attained under this legislation
during its first three years of operation and to high-
light areas requiring additional corrective action.
Since this is the study of a dynamic situation involving
the most complex of all mechanishms, the reaction of
human beings, it is impossible to state that a better
solution to the problem would have resulted hy fo3 lowing
some other course of action. The paper does present
factors tha.t were not properly provided for in the
"Hump Bill" and which should be considered in the* future,
The writer wishes to express his appreciation for
the assistance and encouragement given him by Commander
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One of the major problems facing the United states
today, as always, is the defense of the nation. The
solution to this problem lies in the proper utilization of
available resources, manpower and material. Headlines
continually stress technological breakthroughs and advance-
ments, but little emphasis is placed upon the men who
combine to make these advancements or who make the decisions
on their employment and utilization. All the technological
advancements in warfare will be wasted if we do not have
trained manpower to employ this equipment properly. In
the Navy, this trained manpower starts with the Chief of
Naval Operations and flows downward through a structured
chain of command' and responsibility to the newest recruit
in training. Any weakness in this chain can only serve to
reduce the overall effectiveness of the Navy and the defense
of the nation as a whole.
At the present time there appears to be a weak soot
in this manpower chain residing in the area of those
officers serving in the Commander and Captain rank, or what
has been named "The Hump" . It will be the purpose of this
paper to study this area and attempt to shed some light on
a weak point that may be strengthened and improved.

2.
Button, in his Navigation and Nautical Astronomy
Chapter on piloting! states: "Piloting ia tho art of
conducting a vessel in channels and harbors and along
coasts, where landmarks and aids to navigation are
available for fixing position, where the depth of water
and dangers to navigation require a constant watch and
frequent changes of course. In all phases of piloting,
the navigator must constantly realize that he is dealing
with both the present and the future. He must continually
analyze the situation which exists at present to plan for
the future. He should constantly use every logical means
at his disposal to (1) obtain warnings of approaching
danger; (2) fix the position of the ship accurately and
frequently; (3) determine the proper course of immediate
action. The basic principles of piloting apply in general




Dutton's statements on piloting may be expanded to
apply to any dynamic situation. We must observe where we
have been, analyze the factors that have caused deviations
in our original plotted course, fix our present position,
1Commander Benjamin Dutton, Navigation and Nautical Astronomy
,
(United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, iViaryland, 194b,)
p. 105

and then take departure on a re-evaluated course to L.void
Dhs ivooj.- una sihciuiu. it n->^ y&@n about three years einoe
the "Hump Bill" was enacted into law to remedy problems
resulting from the personnel policies of ..orld ..ar II and
the Korean War. Enough data has now accumulated to
determine the "set and drift" and replot our Personnel
Course if necessary.
when the Hump Bill was awaiting Congressional
Action, writers took pen in hand and stated their view-
point, either pro or con regarding this legislation. "If
passed, ~che Department of the Navy will have begun the
Spartan solution of a problem for which there is no easy
answer. Furthermore, the best possible compromise between
the needs of the service, on the one hand, and equity
2
amongst groups .on the other hand, will result." Or,
"In my opinion, this legislation long will be remembered
because of its drastic nature. Its -ultimate effect on
our Navy probably will not be visible for several years.
It is this ultimate effect that causes concern to me, for
I believe that there is a possibility of lasting damage."-3
2Commander. E. R. Zumwalt, U.S.N. , "Beyond the Hump",
U.S
.
Naval Institute Proceedings, &5 (July, 1959) p. 59
J Vice Admiral A. E. Jarrell, U.S.N. (Ret.), "Lessons Learned




This paper will investigate whether the hump Bill
hus aotually "solved the critical problem in oi'xioor
promotions which we generally refer to as The hump."
STATi&iENT 0? THE PROBLEM
The problem is as stated in the pro and cons
previously cited:
1. Has promotion equity amongst groups been
attained?
2. Have the needs of the service been fulfilled
to the best possible degree?
3. Have any damaging effects (especially of a
lasting nature) resulted?
These three items can be considered the basic
items under investigation, but each needs further
amplification in the study.
The first question, "Has promotion equity amongst
groups been attained?" may be expanded by giving thought
to the caption under a picture in Vice Admiral Jarrell'
s
article which reads: "Midshipmen Taking Their Oath As
Offioers in the U.S. Wavy. Now they are officers, will
they have as fair a chance in the future for selection as
those officers who may be five years their senior or five
Letter to All Naval Officers from the Chief of Naval
Personnel dated 12 August, 1959

5.
years their . unior? Or must they face haphazard promotion
pOllCiOK': "
Note thax this caption uses the term five years'
senior and five .years' junior. Thus if we solve the
problem of the current hump, it cannot be at the expense
of creating troughs or hurrros in succeeding years. This
then ties in with questions 2 and 3» or to sum up and
properly restate the problem we may ask:
Has the Hump Bill attained promotion equity on a
long term basis, fulfilling the needs of the service
with no lasting damaging effects?
5 Jarrell, loc. cit

t>.
History of the Problem
To understand the problem of the Hump, one need
only look at the graph, Figure #1, representing' the
distribution of unrestricted line officers in the U.S.
Wavy on 1 January, 195b. Those officers originally
commissioned in years 1942 to 1945 form a definite hump
in the distribution system and thus the name.
The Hump is a direct result of ./orld war 11 and
Korean war personnel policies that disrupted orderly
officer procurement policies, //hen the national emergency
was declared prior to world ./ar II, our personnel planners
foresaw or were forced to recognize the need for increased
numbers of officers. The curriculum at the U.S. Naval
Academy was modified and graduation of those classes
under instruction was expedited. Thus the Naval Academy
class of 1941 graduated in February, 1941, about 3 months
early. This was followed by graduation of the class of
1942 in December of 1941, seven months early, and the class
of 1943 in June, 1942, one full year early. The entire
output of three Naval Academy classes v/as compressed from
a 24 month span to a 15 month span. This same procedure
was followed at Naval Reserve Officer Training colleges



































addition, academic attrition from these year groups was
low due to the eri'Sioal neoaa of tih© eervioe. In some
cases those who failed academically at the Kaval Academy
entered Reserve Officer Indoctrination training and were
actually commissioned ahead of "the remainder of their
graduating classes. The needs of the service also re-
quired a great expansion in the input of Kaval Aviators
concurrent with this expansion of shipboard line officers,
thus further complicating the problem.
./hile these statements help to clarify and explain
the cause of the Hump, the official version was given by
the Chief of Naval Personnel as:
"The regular portion of the hump was created ~oy the
transfer program following ..orld War II, when a great
many Reserve and temporary officers were taken into the
Regular Navy. Expansion for Aorea greatly exaggerated
this already abnormal distribution in three ways; first,
normal promotional attrition against the year groups in
the hump was practically nil; second, large numbers of
Reserve and temporary officers in the hump were retained
on active duty; and third, additional Reserve officers of
this same seniority were recalled to active duty for the
emergency. As a net result, about one-fourth of the
officers on active duty in the Navy today are concentrated

in the four ye^.r groups ] ;;42-l 945. " .
'
1 1 1 . . r©ra.t a • rteiiom in tho Navy, Ilka any
expansion in industry, dictated that personnel be
advanced at a rapid rate to .shoulder responsibilities
required by the larger service. .as a result, .graduates
of the Naval Academy class of 1938 had advanced to rank
of Commander by 1Q 45. only 7 years after graduation and
members of the Naval Academy class of 1942 were Lieutenant
Commanders 4 years after graduation. In both of these
cases, advancement actually occurred after the cessation
of hostilities. The only explanation for these advance-
ments apparent at the time was that they were being
utilized as recruitment devices to entice additional
Reserve Officers to transfer to the Regular Navy. Our
greatly expanded Navy could not be manned by Regulars on
active duty and implementation was definitely required.
No person objects to accelerated advancement, but
it too can crea.te pitfalls in the long run. The pitfalls
created in this case were of the long run nature. Those
officers who followed in the trough of the Hump foresaw
^ery limited advancement opportunity for years to come.
An officer earning his commission as an Ensign in 1945
could serve under a superior 5 to 10 years his senior in
r
Bureau of Naval Personnel, line Officer
, Personnel




age yet 15 to 20 years his senior in advancement. This
fact did not ^;o unnotiood o.nd reeigaaa/tioxis beo&me the
order of the day. While the Lorean war intervened to
delay this process, by 1958 the figures had become of
definite concern. Table I presents the resignation





Year Total Total Percentage
Group Service Resigned Between
Graduation and 31
December 1958
1930 28 years 13.64/o
1938 19 years 4.37/o
1942 16 years 15.43:-
1945 13 years 35.9 1o
1946 12 years 47.27/*
1950 8 years 30.93/o
1952 6 years 22.39%
1953 5 years 19.81%
7Commander E. R. Zumvvalt, U.S.N,, "Beyond the Hump,"
U. S . rlaval Institute Proceedings, 85 (July 1959)", p. 64

11.
As stated by the Chief of Naval Personnel, where
th© Hump was corn in //oriel War II. it was also nourished
along by the Korean s/ar. .'.'ith the start of this conflict,
however, exi-snsion occurred once again and officers who had
failed selection were advanced to fulfill the needs of this
expansion. For* example, the,. 1962 U.'S. Navy 'Register
indicates that out of 686 Commanders in Year Group 43-l»
151 had been previously passed over one or more times.
This is 22fo of the Commanders in this year group.
.A look at the promotion history to the grade of
Comma.ride'f top the Fiscal Years 1949 through 1959 indicates
that even though this problem existed following world
....
r
II, the problem continued to proceed without control until
introduction of the Hump Bill,
TABLE IT
Fiscal Year Selections to Commander













Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services United States Senate Eighty-sixth Congress, First














Paced with the problem of stagnation in rank lor
those officers in the Hump ana resignations from those
behind the Rump, the Navy sought and obtained legislation.
The resulting bill was HH 4413 > introduced by the Honorable
Carl Vinson, and known as THE HUM* BILL.
Provisions of the law were explained to all Naval
Officers in a letter irom the Chief of Naval x-ersonnel on
12 August, 1959. Portions of this letter are quoted below
for information.
PROVISIONS OP THE LA.7
CAPTAINS
The Secretary is authorized to convene selections
boards for the purpose of recommending captains for
continuation on the active list, or alternatively,
to direct selection boards convened for promotion,
to recommend captains for continuation on the active
list. Any board convened for this purpose will
conform in composition to that prescribed for a
selection board for promotion of captains of the
same category or corps.
Captains may be considered for continuation in
their fifth or later year in grade. However, they
will be considered only when and if they are in a
continuation zone established by the Secretary for a
board for their category. Category in this usage
means any group in which officers compete for
promotions among themselves. The continuation zones
in each category must be consecutive from year to
year, and officers previously considered for
continuation will not be in any later zone.
In each zone the board may recommend for
continuation on the active list, captains in the
number prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy.

13.
Tno Act contains provisions applicable to
continuation of twice failed Navy captains and
liio 0©1"P@ oolcmele. £hie nominal inoiuuion io
in fact inoperative, because Navy captains ao not
fail the second time for promotion until their
thirtieth .year. The law provides that officers
who would have been considered under the fifth
year provision would not be subject in any event
to later hazard as twice-failed captains.
C0&KLANL3RS
The Secretary is required to convene selection
boards, or to direct selection boards convened for
promotion, to recommend, among commanders who have
failed two or more times of selection to captain,
officers for continuation on the active list. Officers
so recommended in the approved report of a board .would
not be subject to forced retirement until the com-
pletion of 26 years of total commissioned service,
and would not be subject to later continuation boards.
Normally, it is expected that this duty will be
performed by the membership of the selection board
convened for the selection of commanders for promotion.
The field will include officers who, having failed of
selection for promotion the previous year, again fail
of selection by the current board. Unaer the present
schedule of 'promotion zones, therefore, some officers
will be considered for continuation before the com-
pletion of 20 years of total commissioned service
(see discussion of "total commissioned service",
below). Notwithstanding this early consideration,
retirement is not required prior to the completion
of 20 years' total commissioned service.
Consideration for continuation of commanders
will be by categories; that is, in the same com-
petitive grouping as exists for selection for
promotion, lumbers to be continued, will be pre-
scribed for selection boards for promotion.
BOARD ACTION—ALL OFFICERS
For both captains and commanders, the Secretary
prescribes the number who may be continued. Two-
thirds of the acting members must agree that the
recommended officers are those best qualified for

14.
continuation of the officers under consideration.
In addition, the law requires that the board must
report 6h* auiaeu oiT any ethos* offieera under
consideration whose performance of duty has been
such that their retention on the active list would
not be warranted even if an unlimited number of
officers could be continued.
"TOTAL COMMISSIONED SERVICE"
lihe term "total commissioned service," as used
in the law and in this discussion, is the service
defined in the Officer fersonnel Act to determine
when mandatory retirements occur. For line officers
who were originally commissioned as ensigns and have
served continuously on active duty ever since, it
is equcl to actual commissioned service. For former
l.aval Reserve officers whose commissioned service
includes some inactive time, "total commissioned
service" may be different— it is based on the
commissioned service of officers originally com-
missioned in the Regular i^avy who had the same
seniority at the time of the Naval Reserve officer's
transfer to Regular Navy. In addition, other
factors determine the "total commissioned service"
of some specialist officers and staff corps officers.
The year from which each officer's "total
commissioned service" is computed is carried in the
wavy Register in the column headed "Service Date."
ixov/ever, it should be understood that service
commuted from this date does not determine eligibility
for voluntary retirement or amount of retired pay
(except for physical disability). Only active duty
counts toward the minimum service required for
voluntary retirement. Retired pay for non-disability
retirements is computed on the basis of total service
from pay entry date.
RETIREMENT
Captains considered by a continuation board who
are not recommended as best qualified for continuation
are required to retire on June 30 of the fiscal year
in which considered. Twice-failed commanders who
have not been recommended as best qualified for
continuation are required to retire on June 30 of
the fiscal year in which considered for continuation,

15.
or if they will not have completed at least 20 years
of xoxai commissioned service in that year, on June
30 of bhe fiscal year in whioh they complete 20
years of total commissioned service.
Retired pay will be computed at the rate of
2feb of the active duty pay at time of retirement
times the number of years' service creditable for
pay purposes at that time. For the purpose of
determining this multiplier, a period of six months
or more is counted as a full year. If this multi-
plier is less than 20, an officer retiring on the
mandatory date will nevertheless have his retired
pay computed at 50> of his active duty pay.
A lump-sum payment of two thousand dollars is
authorized for each officer retiring under the Act
if all of the following conditions exist in his
case:
(a) he is retired in the grade held on the date
of enactment, or in the grade for which he was on a
promotion list prior to the date of enactment; and
(b) he has not been selected for promotion; and
(c) his name has not been reported as an officer
whose retention would not be warranted in any
circumstances
.
The lump-sum payment is payable on retirement even
though the officer elects to retire voluntarily
prior to the required retirement date.
Officers who are recommended as best qualified
for continuation on the acxive list will not be
subject to retirement under the new lav/ while serving
in the same grade, but will be subject to the
mandatory retirement points for their grade in the
normal promotion law (30 or 31 years if captains,
depending on category, and 26 years if commanders).
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF RETIREMENTS
Retirements under this Act will be considered
to have been voluntary. This provision of lav/ is
intended to prevent any notation in records available





The act expires on 30 June 1965. However, The
Congress recognizes that need for. an extension is
"orobable. It is expected that some provisions must
be used until 1970.
REPEAL OF SECTION 6150, TITLE 10, U.S. C0J)E
The authority to advance officers on the retired
list by reason of having been specially comuiended by
the Secretary for performance of duty in actual
combat prior to 1 January 1947 is repealed, effective
1 November 1959. No such advancements will be made




(a) Unrestricted Line—approximately 35$ of USN
captains will be retired short of 30 years total
service. USN captains will be considered in or after
their fifth year of service in the grade of captain.
The limits of the zone of consideration will be
announced annually by ALNAV; however, in general it
is anticipated that the zones will be as follows:














Those officers continued will retire in their thirtieth
year of service if not selected for flag grade.
COMMANDERS:
(a) Unrestricted Line—All those officers twice
failed of selection to the grade of captain will be
considered for continuation, oince there are
currently on board many commanders who have already
failed of selection tv/o or more times, "PY 60 plans
call for continuation of 33$ • thereafter, officers
will be considered in the year of their second failure,
and the planned continuation percentage is 45/°. It
is important to remember that officers once continued
will not be subjected to another continuation screen-
ing and may remain on board until completion of 26
years' total service for retirement purposes."

18.
Essential Objectives of the Legislation
In the report to accompany H.R. 4413. Mr. Stennis
from the Committee on Armed Services outlined the
essential objectives of the Hump Bill. Three main
headings were listed under the objectives:
"A. To meet future Navy and Marine Corps personnel
needs for experienced officers in senior grades.
B. To avoid excessive accumulation on active duty
of commanders who have twice failed of selection
to captain.
C. Promotion opportunities for officers in the
hump . "
9
The second objective is considered worthy of note
and is extracted from the report in its entirety.
B. To avoid excessive accumulation on active duty
of commanders who have twice failed of selection to
captain.
(1) Importance of c'ommander grade
It is significant that the grade of
commander is the grade in the Navy which has the
most direct contact with both junior officers and
enlisted personnel. The positions held by officers
in this grade place immense responsibility for the
training and instruction of personnel upon them.
Examples of commander billets are command of
destroyers, submarines, aviation squadrons,
executive officers on all types of large naval
vessels, executive officers on air stations and
naval operating bases, operations officers on large
naval craft, and shore positions of corresponding
responsibility
.
Report to accompany HR 4413 86th Congress Session Senate
Report No. 572 Ordered to be printed July 23, 1959 pp 5-7

19.
(2) Results without legislative relief
In the absence of legislative iHellef,
the Navy would be confronted with a serious personnel
problem over the next 10-year period with respect to
the grade of commander. In this grade, out of the
total officers serving in tnis rank the percentage
who have been or would be twice failed of selection
xo captain, yet continued on active duty, would
range between 40 to 60 percent, depending on the
particular year. These officers would receive their
second fai3.ure between the 19th and 22nd year and
continue until the completion of 26 years, unless
voluntarily retired. Three-fourths, or about 3»&00
of the present commanders, will in the absence of
relief, eventually fall in the twice-failed status.
The past experience of the Navy indicates
that limited numbers of officers in this twice-
failed status can be effectively utilized. In the
numbers described above, an intolerable condition is
presented in the grade of commander. It can be
reasonably expected that officers who are twice
failed lose a considerable measure of self confidence,
In addition, both their seniors and juniors are aware
of their status and loss of prestige diminishes their
capacity for personal leadership in these key assign-
ments. The fact that such officers would constitute
the senior portions of the grade inevitably would
further aggravate the assignment of such large
numbers. This acute problem is somewhat peculiar
to the military personnel system which for many years
has operated on the premise of either selection for
advancement or separation within a relatively short
period.
The chart set forth below indicates the
number of commanders who will be on active duty
during the years indicated, together with the
proportion of these officers who would be in a
twice-failed status. The increasing percentage
of twice-failed officers indicates the severity
of the problem without legislative relief.

20.
Accumulation of Commanders in the Unrestricted Line of the
Navy in twice-failed status.
Beginning of Estimated Estimated rercentage
fiscal Year total number total twice- of toxal
of USW failed of USN twice-
commanders selection failed of
on active U&N command- selection
duty begin- ers beginning











(3) Relief with legislation
This legislation will operate to prevent
the excessive accumulation of such twice-failed
officers by" permitting the selective retirement
of commanders after they have been twice failed.
The prospective problem of excessive accumulations
of twice-failed officers is peculiar to tnose in
the hump groups. This problem would not be ex-
pected to continue beyond the temporary period of
the legislation.
In addition to providing for selective
retirement the bill will also have the effect of
reducing the number of twice-failed commanders
since promotion opportunity will be increased for
selections to the grade of captain.
It is noted that while the objective of the lav/ is












indicating the degree of relief that could be expected,
nor xu "QxoouBivQ accumulation" d@fi.nod.
Senator Yarborough proposed a substitute bill for
the Hump Bill to institute a Voluntary Retirement Program.
This substitute bill included a Title 1 which provided
that any captain in the Regular Navy in his 5th or sub-
sequent year of service in his present grade, and any
commander in the Regular Navy in his 20th or subsequent
year of commissioned service, if not on a promotion list,
would be eligible to apply for voluntary retirement. The
Secretary of the Navy would be required to act on each
application within one year from the time it was made and
would be required to approve applications for retirement
in such numbers as the Secretary determined to be in the
best interests of the service. Officers retired under
this bill would receive, in addition to their retired
pay, a lump-sum payment in the amount of 3 months' basic
f pay for each year of early retirement, without limitation
as to the total amount. Early retirement was to be based
upon 30 years' service for captains and 26 years1 service
for commanders.
Title 1 was to be in effect for at least 2 years.
If this voluntary program did not produce sufficient
vacancies to provide ample opportunity for promotion, the
Secretary was authorized to place the mandatory retirement

c£L,
program of the Hump Bill into effect.
Thlu proposal was conoiaored unworkable uincc it
would require a two year de3.ay for the trial period and
would not .rovide a means for the retention of the most
effective officers. In addition it was pointed out that
officers could retire under laws existing at the time if
they so desired. An interesting statement is contained
in the Navy Department's reply to Senator Russell on
this oroposal.
"The possibility of retirement after only 20 years
of active service is primarily a strong inducement to
young officers to enter upon a military career. 3y
the time they reach the 20-year point, however, most
of them have become motivated toward rounding out a
full career of 30 years or more. Providing an
extravagant financial inducement to career minded
officers to abandon that ambition would be contrary
to the principles of The military profession, would
tena to destroy the motivation that has been care-
fully nourished for 20 years, and would reflect 10
adversely on the continuation of a military career."
The attitude of the U. S. position on solving
the Hump problem can be contrasted to the procedure
?
utilized in the Royal iMavy by referring to Annex I-
Royal Navy dealing with this same problem. It should be
noted that the exchange rate existing at the time was
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The special capital .payments shown are those payable to officers who retire on
attaining the ages stated. For officers who retire later air adjustment will be made of
one-twelfth of any difference between this amount and the next amount for
each additional month completed.
Officers will receive retired pay and terminal grant for service rendered in accordance
with the normal rules, having regard to the nature of their previous service, with a
minimum qualifying period of 10 years service.
tm*ph I
A typical Captain R.N., if retired at age 42 with under 6 years in the rank and
with 21 years reckonable service, will receiver-
Retired pay £800 a year
Terminal grant ...
^»^°^\fg4nfi






A typical Commander, if retired at age 40 with 19 years reckonable service,
will receive:— s . ',
Retired pay
.
t ".> fifWTerminal grant ..'. >.-,-< ':..' ^^50\£74M .. -, : -; »'



























A typical Lt.-Commander {Special Duties List), if retired at age 47 with 20 yean
reckonable service, will receive:
—
Retired pay
... £500 a year
Terminal grant
... ... £1,5001-* ^^
Special Capital payment ... £2,180/",pw .•
(Normally all these officers would receive the retired pay and terminal grant.)
Examptt 5 V
A typical Lieutenant (Upper Yard-man), if retired at age 33, with 12 years
reckonable service, will receive:
Retired pay ... ... .... ... £355 a year .',*, 'p-itA'
Terminal grant i-«-AH?v&;. £I,065\riCft,c . / _r
Special Capital payment • ... ....->.;>... £5,000
J**'***
>,' -









In investigating any problem, it becomes necessary
to compile factual data pertaining to the problem, analyze
the data, and then draw conclusions based upon the results.
Preconceived opinions and judgments should not enter into
the study though they may assist in spotlighting areas
that need investigating.
One area for study became apparent by simply reading
the precedence list of officer instructors at the U. S.
Naval Postgraduate School for 1961. Out of 2^ 'Commanders
attached as instructors for Junior Officers, 17 or 58. 6>£
had failed selection. This figure although very undesire-
able is not considered unusual in view of statements in
the January 1962 Personnel Newsletter that "approximately
one-fourth of all unrestricted line commanders and
approximately one-third of all unrestricted line Lieutenant
Commanders are serving in a failed of selection status. It
* becomes readily apparent that shore activities, overseas
bases and afloat or shore based staffs must absorb and
effectively utilize the non-selected officers." By
limiting the billets available to non-selected officers,
specific duty stations will necessarily have a high
13 Bureau of Naval Personnel, LIFE OFFICER , Personnel
Newsletter, Vol. 5-No. 2 (Jan. 1962, NavPers-1589?) p. 16

24.
percentage of these officers on board.
These percentage figures coupled with r,he fact
that "the Navy's Commander continuation boards meeting
in fiscal 3 963 can keep all twice-passed-over Commanders
12
on duty until they finish 26 years of commissioned service"
cast doubts on the effectiveness of the "Hump Bill" and
raised several questions as to what has transpired since
passage of the bill.
In the initial explanation letter TO ALL NAVAL
OFFICERS on 12 August, 1959, Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of
the Bureau of Naval Personnel, discussing Commander
continuation, stated that "FY 60 plans call for continuation
of 33>°« Thereafter, officers wil] be considered in the
year of their second failure, and the planned continuation
percentage is 45'/°."
The Memorandum to All Officers dated 18 July, 1961
estimated a "percentage continuation of 65$."
Thus in spite of the fact that shore stations have
a high percentage of non selected officers, our projected
plans for forcing out twice passed over Commande?',s went
from 67c/o to Oc/o in four years time and over a period of one
12News item in NAVY TliViPS
, Vol.11 No. 39 (July 11, 1962) p. 4
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year, this figure dropped from 35'/° to O'/S.
Two Questions rani ee from th»H© polioy ohaneiofii
1. why is it no longer necessary to employ
Hump procedures in the commander rank?
2. Are the best interests of the Navy being
served by not employing Hump procedures?
Assuming that personnel policy planners have not
made any errors in their computations on the number of
commanders necessary each year, the answer to the first
question becomes obvious. There is sufficient attrition
in the commander rank through retirement, death, and
administrative separations such that forced attrition is
not presently required. This would also indicate that
Senator Yarborough 1 s proposed monetary inducement was not
needed, for enough officers must be retiring on a voluntary
basis to remedy the situation. The Navy Department's
reply to the Yarborough proposal also appears to have
missed the mark with the statement "By the time they reach
4
the 20-year point, however, most of them have become
motivated tov/ard rounding out a full career of 30 years
15
or more."
One objective of the Hump Bill was to provide an
15^Report to accompany HR 44-13 86th Congress Session Senate
Report No. 572 Ordered to be printed July 23, 1959 p. 42
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orderly flow of advancement. The Yarborough substitute
wu., objootod to "boouuoa tho laooretury would luiVo no
means of forecasting the number of applications for
voluntary retirement that might be submitted in any
-1 c
year." This objection may well apply to the present
legislation if the above assumptions are valid. The fact
that personnel planners could miss the continuation figure
by 35$ over a one year period should be a cause for concern
and appraisal.
The second question: "Are the best interests of the
Navy being served by not employing Hump procedures?" is
not so easily answered. Assumptions may be made on this






In analysing the problem "Kara the Hump Bill
attained promotion equity on a long- term basis, fulfill-
ing the needs of the service with no lasting damaging
effects?", certain assumptions were made based on personal
observation. In the text Principles of Managemerit , the
statement is made—
"
Personal observation . In any
preoccupation with the devices of managerial control,
one should never overlook the importance of control through
personal observation. Budgets, charts, reports, ratios,
auditor's reports and other devices of control can be
helpful, if not essential to control. But the manager
who relies on these devices and sits, so to speak in a
soundproof control room reading dials and manipulating
levers, can hardly expect to do a thorough job of control.
Management is, after all, getting things done through
people, and, although many scientific devices aid in making
sure that people are doing that which the manager has hoped
and planned for them, the problem of control is still one of
17human relations."
personal observations gave indications that a lar^e
percentage of officers who were not selected for promotion
17Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of Management
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 195^), p. 610

from Coramander to Captain were retiring early before
I © l -i on Oi' their 26 yearn' norvioo. It was alad ob-
served that there appeared to be definite differences
between those who rehired early and those who were electing
to remain in the service. Many electing to remain were
aviators, and often had originally entered the Navy with
less formal education than the general line or 1100
designated officer.
Based on these observations, assumptions were made
and a study conducted. It was assumed that a high percent-
age of officers who elected to remain in the service after
failing selection would have aviation designation 1300. A
second assumption 'was that officers who elected 00 remain
would not be as well qualified from the standpoint of
educational background as those who left the service. If
the study proved these assumptions to be true to a s
nificant degree, it could be concluded that the Hump "Bill
was not operating as intended and unless revised or
modified by administrative policy on retirement lasting
damaging effects could result. Specifically, the promotion
of 1300 officers entering the Commander rank would have to
be slowed down (or more 1100 billets converted to 1300"
billets) and if those with higher education were leaving
the service the input for this training would have to be
increased as time went by.
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Considerations that would tend to support the
assumptions would be:
1. Those with the best education would be most
able to compete for positions in industry
(especially those with advanced degrees).
2. Commanders with 1300 designators would be
more reluctant to retire since they would suffer
a larger financial loss due to incentive oay
($2940 per year).
These arguments could be balanced out by such
factors as family considerations, employment opportunities
due to service or family connections, personality traits





It was realized at The start of the data
collection process that severe difficulties would be
encountered in obtaining accurate data. This was due
to two basic obstacles: 1) All retirements under the
Hump Bill "will be considered to have been voluntary.
This provision of law is intended to prevent any notation
in records available to the public which would identify
any retirement as a mandatory retirement".
this information it is impossible to separate actual
voluntary and involuntary retirements. 2) Since figures
on selection, retirement, and separation, are constantly
changing, it would be necessary to establish a cut off
date and base all figures on this date.
In view of these difficulties and definite limit-
ations, it was decided that results of this study could
not possibly provide firm factual data. The object of the
i study, therefore, was to provide background information
for a more exhaustive survey if this was found warranted.
-| c
Letter to All Naval Officers i'rom the Chief of Naval





Since the object of the study was to determine
whether or not the Hump Bill was fulfilling the needs
of the service as originally designed, it was decided
to investigate how the hill was handling the problem of
those officers in the commander rank who failed selection.
Data available from the Navy Register was considered
sufficiently accurate for this purpose. It should be
noted that this data gives the status of personnel ac of
1 January for a particular year and thus numbers of
officers in grade will include some commanders selected
for promotion to captain and will be minus some lieutenant
commanders selected to the commander rank. Since this is
a constantly changing situation, any date selected will
be subject to these same variations.
m
It should also be
noted that minor discrepancies undoubtedly exist due to
this counting process vice a more accurate modem computer
system. Regardless of these problems, any trends should
be easily established and noted.
The Navy Registers for the years 1959 through 1962
were used and the number of commanders of the unrestricted
line obtained. The number of 1100 and 1300 officers on
duty was obtained for each year along with the number of
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HOC and 1300 officers serving in a failed selection
Bta*&U8. 'i-Uiiti latter data waa obtained by noting alx
those in the promotion zone for that year who were lack-
ing a notation by their name as having been selected.
These figures were considered significant even though
the officer may have failed selection only one time.
3y Bupers statements, policy and tradition, these
ficers were in a status whereby they would not be
assigned to command at sea and consequently could
rcasonaoly be considered to be in a "limited duty status."
After compiling data on results of selections for
past years, it was considered advisable to group officers
by year groups as they would be considered for selection
in future years and obtain figures for 1100 and 1300
designated officers in each group'. This data was com-
piled from the 1961 and 1962 Navy Registers. The data
was then utilized to visualize promotion opportunities
i
of the 1100 and 1300 officers in these year groups and
the effect of The composition of the group that failed
selection on the overall composition 'of the commander
rank.
In analyzing the effect of non-selection on officers
having had Postgraduate training, data was extracted from
a study by Lieutenant iNewton C. Youngblood on The effect
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of r' os tgraduate Education on Selection from Commander to
Qattain in the U. a. Navy . This study inrtioatod thai; u
relatively high percentage of officers who are well
qualified educationally are not selected for promotion.
Results were as listed in Table VII. Since the study-
covered the promotion zone for fiscal years 1960-1962,
and since these officers are just now becoming eligible
for voluntary retirement, their action towards early
retirement and the impact of their non-selection has yet
19to be fully realized.
To understand future implications of this data
and obtain a "prediction indicator," it was considered
advisable to gather the same type data for an earlier
year group. The Naval Academy clashes of 1940 and 1941,
and contemporary officers, were affected by the Hump Bill,
have had an opportunity to evaluate their situation, and
have met requirements for early retirement whereas those
officers considered in Lieutenant Youngblood' s study
have not.
Data was compiled for the Naval Academy classes of
1940 and 1941 and all other officers in this promotion zone
The object here was to determine whether any particular
19^ Lieutenant Newton C. Youngblood, "The Effect of Postgraduate
Education on Selection from Commander to Captain in the U.S.




category of officer tends to retire early after failing
aolootion 1'or the ©oaemd tiroo. Factors oonai dorod
consisted of 1100 designator, 1300 designator, Naval
Academy education, and Postgraduate education. The survey
was limited to these categories due to the type and source
of data available. A more comprehensive survey should
properly include such items as age of officer, age and
number of children, age at mandatory retirement, special
qualifications not listed in the Wavy Register and other
intangibles that could best be obtained by a personnel
questionnaire. These were reluctantly omitted as being
beyond the scope of this study.
After determining the number of officers in the
various categories who failed selection, data was
obtained using the 1962 Navy Register to determine how
many of these officers remained on active duty as compared






Results of the study show that on 1 January, 1959,
there were 700 unrestricted line commanders on active duty
who had failed selection one or more times out of 4&40 in
grade or 14.5$. Of these 700 commanders, 3&5 had an
1100 designator and 315 were aviators with a 1300
designator. In the three year period from 1959 to 1962,
the commander strength remained at about the 4&00 level
each year, and each year the total number of officers
serving in a non-selected status has increased. The
number of officers with 1100 designators has remained
relatively constant during this period, whereas the
number v/ith 1300 designators has more than doubled, going
from 315 in 1959 to 718 as of 1 January, 1962. This data
is included in Table III and illustrates what has trans-
pired since enactment of the Hump Bill.
The problem to be confronted in the future is
{"portrayed by Table IV and Figure 2. dumber of Unrestricted
Line Commanders are tabulated by year group, fiscal year
in which they will be considered for selection and




NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF UNRESTRIOTED LINE COMMANDERS
HAVING FAILED SELECTION ONE OH MORE TIMES
1 January Total Total c/o






















RESTRICTr$D LINE COMMANDERS ON DUTY AS OF 1 JANUARY, 1962
BY YEAR GROUPS 20
YEAR UNRESTRICTED FISCAL YEAR
GROUP COMMANDERS 1100 #1100 1300 #1300 IN ZONE
42-0 1373 541 39.4 832 60.6
43-1 686 172 25.2 514 74.8 1963
43-2 699 281 40.3 418 59.7 1964









45-2 593 293 49.4 300 50.4 1967
46-0 152 64 42. 88 48.
TOTALS 4796 1905 39.8 2891 60.2
20Fiscal Year in Zone as outlined in Memorandum "uo All
Officers Bureau of Naval Personnel Memorandum of





I \ 1300 DESIGNATOR
HH1 SELECTED
43-2 44-1 44-2 44-3 45-1 45-2
42-2 42-3 43-1 43-2 44-1 44-2 44-3 45-1
FIGURE 2
UNRESTRICTED LINE COMMANDERS
TOTALS AND PERCENTAGE MOO TO 1300























The data reveals that in the next three years,
i "/QL offiooro with 1100 doaiSTiatore will bo aonuidorod
for promotion for the first time along with 1339 officers
with 1300 designators, or a ratio of almost 2 aviators for
every non-aviator considered. Using the percentage
selection figures for fiscal years 1960-1962 as a guide
(47.5$ for 1100 officers and 29.3% for 1300 officers)
we can project that about 350 of those with 1100
designators will fail selection in the next 3 years
along with 900 officers with 1300 designators.
The data also indicates that if the ratio of
1100 to 1300 officers being selected to the Captain
rank in the past 3 years was balanced as desired, then
on a pure numbers basis the percentage of aviators to be
selected in the next three years must decrease and the
percentage of those not selected must increase, thus
further aggravating the situation. This is presented
below in Table V.
»•
TABL2 V
COftiMAlNiDERS SELECTED TO CAPTAIN
ACTUAL PROJECTED
Fiscal Years 1960-1962 Fiscal Years 1963-1965
Total No. selected Total fto. selected
1100 792 376 1100 708 358
1300 1123 329 1300 1339 439
53.4% of those selected 45% selected would be
were 1100 officers 1100 officers
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The projected data obtained in Table V indicates
that we might reasonably expaot 350 Commanders with 1X00
designators and 900 Commanders with 1300 designators to
fail selection in the next three years. If all of these
officers elect to remain on active duty until forced to
retire by virtue of having 26 years' of service, control
of the ratio of aviators to non-aviators can be maintained
by the continuation procedures as set forth in the Hump
Bill. However, if a large number of these officers elect
to retire prior to completion of 26 years' service, we will
have generated additional problems and will be faced with
additional alternative courses of action:
1. Accept retirement requests, control the un-
balance between aviators and non-aviators by non-
continuation and accept a decrease in the number of
Commanders in the Navy.
2. Same as above but increase the inflow of
officers into the Commander grade.
3. Regulate the acceptance of retirement requests
such that requests from officers in certain categories will
be deferred or not accepted while still controlling by
non-continuation of other categories.
4. Disregard any unbalance between aviators and
non-aviators and change billet assignments as necessary.
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None of these alternative actions appear attractive
from the viewpoint of orefit in^- an effective fi^htin^
service.
Figures were compiled to determine the effect of
failure of selection of those officers who were graduates
of the Naval Academy classes of 1940, 1941, and contemp-
oraries. Only those officers who had advanced with their
groups up to this point were considered in this data. For
Naval Academy graduates, this is listed below in Table VI.
TABLE VI













TOTAL 99 38 75 28 15 6
PG 41 16 30 12 6 4
NON PG 58 22 45 16 9 ' 2
Table indicates that of
343 GRADUATES viliO ./ERE ON DUTY IN 1959
137 Failed selection a first time
103 Failed selection a second time
21 Remain on active duty
82 Have retired or been separated
Therefore 79.6$> of those non-selected the second
time are no longer on active duty as opposed to the Hump
Bill's maximum proposed 35v° non-continuation.
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The results here indicated that approximately 80$
01 ivhorjo who frrilori uolontion a HQQQr\r\ tirno did not oloot
to remain on active duty (or were non-continued) prior to
completion of 26 years' active service. The difference
"between those having postgraduate training. 1300 or 1100
designators was insignificant, particularly considering
the small numbers involved.
A similar study was made for non Naval Academy
graduates in this same year group and in this case, 80,3$
of those failing selection two times are no longer on
active duty.
Results of this very limited survey indicated that
about 80$ of all officers, regardless of background,
educational qualifications, or other distinguishable
characteristics left the service early. The major factor
not considered in the study was forced separation by non-
continuation. Since all retirements due to non-continuation
are considered as voluntary retirement under the Hump Bill
no effort was made to obtain these figures. However,
since Naval Academy graduates and officers with post-
graduate training have a relatively high selection
percentage as illustrated by Table VII; one could reason-
ably assume that individuals in these categories would be
subject to a lower non-continuation percentage. It
would follow that a significantly higher percentage of
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Naval Academy graduates and of i'icers with postgraduate
training leave the service after failing selection the
second time than do non-Naval Academy graduates and
those without postgraduate training.
Table VII is presented to illustrate the composition
of officers who have failed selection in the past 3 years.
If these officers fail selection a second time, and if 80>o
of these officers retire early, one may visualize the
numbers of well qualified officers who will be lost by
voluntary early retirement.
TABLE VII
1100 Designated Commanders in Promotion Zone—Fiscal Years
1960-1962
Source of Commission Number Number non- ^non-selected
selected
Naval Academy 220 130 40.6
With P.G. 147 55 37.4
Without P.G. 173 7-5 43.4
{ Non-Naval Academy 472 286 6u.6
With P.G. 96 44 45.8
Without PiG. 376 242 64.3





The data presented herein was derived in an effort
to evaluate the past performance of jjersonnel policies
under the Hump Bill and highlight any trouble areas that
might lie ahead. The question under investigation v/as
whether "the Hump Bill has attained promotion equity on a
long term basis fulfilling the needs of the service with
no lasting damaging effects."
It must be stated that in the process of researching
this subject, much information v/as gained that was omitted
from the paper. The primary reason for the omission was
that it v/as desired to limit the scope of the work to
conclusions that could be reasonably justified and sub-
stantiated by the facts gained in the research. General
impressions were gathered during the study that are
considered worthy of comment.
After study of the problem it is obvious that some '
legislative action was required to alleviate the problem
that existed and was increasing as each year passed on.
In this respect the Hump Bill must be considered as a
successful effort for a first step in the solution of a
difficult and continuing problem. It is also true, however,
that certain factors, influences and assumptions were
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overlooked or otherwise not provided for in the Hump Bill.
The major omissioni and the on© moat likely to have
damaging and lasting effect is the procedure of considering
officers for promotion at an early date and then retaining
a large percentage of them on active duty for an extended
period of time after they fail selection. The Yarhorough
amendment was an effort to solve this problem by enticing
officers to retire voluntarily and thus reduce the number
of personnel in senior grades. The Navy rejected this
plan because "it is non selective retirement, it does not
give the Navy the control over the quality of the officer
being promoted or of the officer retiring that we have
21
under the hump legislation." This statement, projected
non-continuation forecasts, all testimony on hearings
before subcommittees, and actual data to date reveal that
the assumption that Naval Officers desire to remain on
active duty until forced to retire is erroneous. The Chief.
Bureau of Naval Personnel. Admiral Smith, testified "We
like to feel that we have during the time an officer serves
on active duty his complete absorbtion, his complete
devotion to his duties, and he is not trying to prepare
21Hearing oefore a Suocommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services United States Senate Eighty-sixth Congress, First
Session on HR 4413 June 22, 1959 p. 44
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himself for a second career or a career after he is
retired. And go in order to get that complete attention
to his duty and devotion to it, we have asked for this
legislation which gives retirement points at the 30 and
2226 year point."
The basis for the assumption that officers who
twice fail selection will still desire to remain on
active duty is unknown but may have been predicated on
information available from surveys such as Table VIII.
The reliability and validity of surveys such as the one
cited will be influenced by the circumstance of the times
and it is doubted if any survey could project and predict
beforehand the action of a group of individuals who are
abruptly confronted with problems of reduced prestige,
limited work assignments, and extremely low opportunity
for further advancements.





naval oyyiGsa attitudes* ^
OH RETIREMENT PLANS
burvey conducted in 194b1 on all Naval ships and
stations and covering all ranks and corps. A statistically
reliable sample of 4442 cases was obtained.










Plan to retire on 20 year option
^lan to retire on 30 year option








The fact that IIaval Officer Attitudes on Retirement
Plana ohange in a decade should not com© aa a surprise co
our personnel planners if they consider the pressures
acting upon officers at the time that they complete 20
years' service. A very high percentage of these ofiicers
will fall in the 40 to 45 year age bracket. Those failing
promotion are faced with the choice of retiring early and
starting a second career or delaying the process for
approximately four years and then staring this second
career with no pay increase for Commanders after 22 years'
service. In evaluating this choice they must assume that
the longer they delay retirement," the poorer their chances
of starting a second career become. The validity of this
assumption has been checked by a survey to determine
employer's views on employment possibilities in relation
to the age of the applicant and results of the survey are
presented in Tables IX and X. These- tables illustrate
that those in the age group 40-45 are in a critical
position and beyond this point, employment consideration
is poor. After age 45 an individual is definitely on




PERCENTAGE OV 69 EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES 1 VIEWS AS fi'0 THE
EMPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES IN RELATION .TO THE AGE OF THE
APPLICANT £4
EMPLOYMENT AGE GROUPS OF APPLICANT, EMPLOYMENT
POSSIBILITY AGENCIES MENTIONING, PER CENT
CONSIDERATION 10-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55
EXCELLENT ; 45 20 5
GOOD 47 52 27 5
FAIR 8 27 48 39 13
POOR 1 18 40 39
BAD 2 16 48
TABLE X
PERCENTAGES OF 104 CIVILIAN EMPLOYER VIEWS ON AGE GROUPS
CONSIDERED MOST DESIRABLE kVHEN HIRING EXECUTIVES OR
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES








Age not considered a factor 15
No response 4
Robert Bruce Bretland, "Some Aspects of the Problem of
Civilian Job Placement and Readjustment Education of
Retiring Naval Officers" (Unpublished Master's Thesis,
The Ohio State University, Columbus, 1950), pp 92-104
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A wealth of data similar to Tables IX and X is
available to officers facing the retirement problem and
with one quarter of the Navy's Commanders eminently
concerned and available to pool resources and disseminate
information, the subject is well covered and understood.
In addition, the concern shown by the Navy in this matter
and resultant study group reports are ready sources of
information. As an example, the Michigan Study stated
that the character of military profession has changed and
for many persons military service would be the first "step
in a two step career. This study further stated that
"Congress should have introduced new concepts in management
of military retirement system.
1. Keep personnel on active duty for longer periods
or
2, Helease them earlier so that they can be , )C-
effectively integrated into the civilian labor force.""
No doubt much of the Michigan Study reflected the
opinions of Doctor Morris Janowitz, author of The
Professional Soldier and a member of the study group. In
his book he wrote, "Consequently, the entire concept of
retirement has undergone a change. No longer is retirement
25^ News item in the ANAF Journal, 15, July, 1961
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the final phase of a gentleman's career, a continuation
of the military sty]© of life. It is merely another step
in career management. The Army no longer speaks of
retirement, but of a "second" career. The retirement age
has now been lowered, so that many more officers, including
those who entered into the leadership cadre, do not serve
the full thirty year term. These officers must take
another job."
Thus it is concluded that personnel policy planning
in the past, as evidenced by projected continuation
percentages, has been based upon the assumption that once
a naval officer has served for an extended period of time
he will desire to remain in the service until forced to
retire. This misconception can be likened to the observation
that
"the thinking of industry has until recently tended
to focus on pay as the dominant employee motive."
In studies on the effect of pay on motivation with regard
to Doth workers and executives it was concluded that "in
all cases ego-motivation rather than economic motivation
is predominant. vi'e are thus led to the interesting con-
clusion that popular psychology is wrong about both
26
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe,
Illinois: The Free Press. I960) pp. Ib5-lb6
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executives and workers. Neither group is primarily
oonoarnod about pay as such, except when eoonornio&iIXy
pinched. At other times they prefer ego-satisfactions
such as prestige, power, recognition, security, treatment
27
as an individual."
If this ego-satisfaction theory applies to both
executives and workers in industry is it too unrealistic
to conclude that it also applies to the Navy? One look
at the ego-satisfaction factors listed
—
prestige, power,
recognition, security, treatment as an individual, reveals
that each factor is lacking in the case of the non-selected
officer.
It is the conclusion of this study, as substantiated
by the data taken from one year group (admittedly meager
and tenuous) that ego satisfactions play a predominant role
in the actions of our senior officers facing- problems of
remaining in the service or voluntary retirement. These
ego-satisfactions overpower all other considerations and
i
thus we can expect a heterogeneous group to retire rather
than any specific segment as was assumed at the initiation
of this study.
27 Paper on Motivation by Ross Stagner
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It should be noted that in the recent past,
officers have been considered for promotion no til© rank
of Captain in their lbth, 19th, or 20th year. As this
promotion point is delayed until the initial consideration
comes in the 22nd year of service there exists the strong
possibility that each officer will carefully weigh his
future opportunities in the service as compared with re-
tiring at a younger age and starting a second career upon
completion of 20 years' service. The implication is that
the relationship of retirement points to promotion points
is a critical one that must be given thoughtful consider-
ation in any future personnel planning.
It is finally concluded that the relationship of
retirement to promotion point is not properly located at
present under the Hump Bill. The large number of officers
retiring voluntarily from the critical rani: of Commander





as stated originally, this paper was written to
study the problems associated with and involving the Hump.
The officers serving in the Bureau of Naval Personnel who
must live with this problem and make decisions each day
concerning the execution of established policies remain
slaves to and influenced by the present Hump Mil. Their
thoughts, and any recommendations they might make concern-
ing this problem, would certainly reflect their experiences
in their present assignments. Yet these same officers by
their intimate connection with, and concern for the
problem, with the wealth of data available from computers
and mechanized records, possess unique talents that make
them the best qualified to properly solve this problem.
They fail in only one area; namely, that tney both
establish and execute the policies, and when these
policies go astray, there exists an excessive time lag-
before corrective action is initiated. Thus while they
attempt to justify and rectify their errors, the
situation compounds itself and proceeds dangerously
out of control. Regardless of the good intentions and
efforts on their part, this situation can exist, has
existed in the past, and may well occur in the future.




this situation. The Princip3.es oi kanagement states
"^i rriil.'j.r xemuQB are involved in "ch© emf<ioym«nt of an
outside auditor and in the separation of accounting
from the finance function. The certification of
financial records could hardly be made by a subordinate
in the treasurer's department. And since the. accounting-
activities are useful checks upon the treasurer, who has
control of the enterprise funds, they might be auite
harmless indeed if the chief accountant reported to the
treasurer, or vice versa. The principle of separation
that an activity designed as a check on another activity
must not be assigned to the department on whose activities
it checks—is a valuable and invariable rule. The
organizer is always on firm ground when he applies this
principle, both at the time a new activity is created and
when he carries out his examination of the organization
structure.
"
The above statement creates the general conception
dit is limited iO financial matters, money
that can be counted or material that can be inventoried,
una this has been the general application within the Navy
Koontz and Cyril 0' Donne11, principles of management
./ York: mcG-raw-Hill, 1959), p. 131
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to date. The text also states, however, that "It is
true that most Internal auditors limit themselves to
matters of the integrity of accounts and corporate assets,
but there is no reason why the concept of internal audit-
ing should not be broadened in practice. Perhaps the
only limiting factors are the ability of a company to
afford so broad an audit, the difficulty of obtaining
men who can do a broad type of audit, and the very
practical consideration that no one likes to be reported
or spied upon. While persons responsible for accounts
and for the safe-guarding of company assets have learned
to accept the audit, those who are responsible for far
more valuable things, the execution of the plans, policies,
and procedures of a company have not so readily learned
29
to accept the idea of being audited."
It has been often said that the most valuable asset
the Navy has consists of the men who have dedicated their
lives to service, and yet this asset has never been
realistically audited along guidelines established by
currently accepted sound management practices. Certainly
our personnel policy makers can argue that their decisions
are under continual review by Congress and the various
29 Ibid p. 610
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civilian boards and study groups set up explicitly for
that purpose • All of these otudy ^roupa una organi zationn,
including the navy comptroller who has the assigned
responsibility for auditing, fall far short of the capability
of conducting a true internal audit.
In view of the above, it is recommended xhat:
1. Provisions be made i'or the periodic eatabl ishment




xo review and analyze our
personnel poij cies . The composition of this audit group
would vary with the area under survey but would in each
case
,
consist of some members who would be directly
affected by the report of the group .
For example, in the case of a study on the Hump
problem, the composition of the audit board would be
A. Senior member
A Naval Officer of rank of Admiral to provide
the wisdom and experience necessary and evaluate
the influence of the report on the future
personnel policies of the Navy. An officer who
has not previously been responsible for personnel
policies.
8. Second member
.. senior Captain who h:xs had previous duty
in the establishment of personnel policies and
can thus advise on the implications and complic-
ations of any recommendations made by the board.
C. Two civilian members
rfo provide civilian liason, reflect the impact
that action of the board might have on indusxry,
and to give weight to any recommendations that
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might later be utilized in persuading Congress to
obtain desired implementation of provisions of the
report through legislative notion.
D. Four additional members
Two of these officers (preferably one aviator
and one non-aviator) should be members of the group
direotly affected as a result of any action on the
boards report; one should be slightly senior to
the nump and one slightly junior. These members,
by their intimate concern with the problem under
consideration, should provide insight and assist
in interpreting the action, reaction, and implic-
ations of the report as it will affect them and
their contemporaries. Their presence on the audit
board should enhance the possibility of gathering-
more meaningful and pertinent data and expand the
alternatives towards a more equitable solution of
the problem.
The purpose of recommending the establishment of
an audit board, with the composition as outlined above,
is not to provide some form of democratic representation,
but rather to create a group capable of auditing and
understanding policies in existence in the light of our
rapidly changing times.
Personnel policies that worked in one decade do
not necessarily carry over to the next any better than
do weapons or other instruments of war.
Since the Hump Bill directly influences the retire-
ment date for our senior officers, it is recommended that:
2. A thorough study be conducted as to the most
advantageous time at which retirement should occur, both
from the individuals' standpoint, and the Navy 1 s standi)pint .

57.
Data gathered, in this paper would indicate that a
Commander in th« wavy will have completed slightly over
20 years' service at the time he is first considered for
promotion to the rank of Captain. His chances for
promotion will he about 40> and this will assure him of
five years' additional service. After five years' service
he must face a continuation board that will discontinue
one-third of the officers considered at that time. The
insecurity developed by this procedure can only serve as
a detriment to both the individual and the i\iavy. Some
may argue that insecurity and competition are a good thing.
Dr. Rensis Likert, Professor of sociology at the University
of Michigan, disputes t/iis theory. In speaking before the
industrial science section oi the American .association for
the Advancement of Science, he said "what lots of super-
visors don't know, however, is that the safer a man feels
in his job, the better job he'll do. Bosses sometimes
think a man does better work if he feols a little
insecure.
"
The recommendation that the point of promotion
retirement be carefully investigated is not meant to be
J I\;ews item in the San Jose Mercury, 15 October, 1962

56.
restricted to this one subject, but should properly
include all the associated byproduote. If military
service has become the first half of a two-career life,
there must be some dividing point between those who will
pursue a one-career life and those who pursue a two-
career life.
This point should be established and made known,
and those who leave the service should not be confronted
with restrictions that prevent them from obtaining
employment as any other citizen might.
It is recommended that:
3. The Defense Department take a more active part
in tnis two career life by revising their present stand
on the subject.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for i.ianpower, Norman
t'aul in speaking before a conference concerning the two-
i
career service said "the Defense Department feels a
f moral obligation toward the retired military man. But
Defense could not and would not provide job placement
for them." 31
By taking a more active part, the Defense Department
^1 News item in the Navy Times, January 2, 1963

59.
could channel retired officers into positions where
their experience and knowledge in matters affooting
the national defense would benefit all concerned. A
group established to perform this function could
dampen out personnel fluctuations brought on by cold
war recalls in future years and gain valuable experience
and knowledge in effective utilization and transfer of
service personnel to civilian employment should that
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